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Purpose and Justification 
The purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis :that there has 
been.a significant alteration of the bloc system of voting in the United 
Nations General Assembly. This hypothesis is being tested in,order·to 
determine whether there has been a transformation.of thebipolar·nature 
of international politics which developed innnediately after the termi-
nation of World War II. 
Beginning late in 1945 the wartime coalition of anti-Axis powers 
began to break up. Many points of friction developed between the western 
nations and the Soviet Union, including the status of Germany, Austria, 
and Korea; Conununist threats .to Turkey, Greece, and Iran; and the control 
of nuclear weapons. The creation of the two opposingmilitary-alliances, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.and the Warsaw Pact, formalized 
the establishment of two hostile blocs in international politics. 
For a time after·the commencement of the Cold War the two bloc 
leaders, the Soviet Union,and the United States, tended to view every 
country as either an.ally or an enemy. At the Nineteenth Party Congress 
of October 1952 the Soviet Union abandoned the post-1945 dogi:na which 
· divided the world· into two camps, and depicted a tripartite division. 
In this division there existed, aside from the West and the Connnuni~ts, 
l 
a third grouping of underdeveloped and largely uncommitted countries. 
It became the official aim of the Soviet Union to win the third group 
to its side and thus isolate the West.Cl) 
By the mid"-1950 1 s the United States had also abandoned its attempt 
to perpetuate the rigid bipolar system. This modification in American 
foreign policy became evident in the change of·attitude of the United 
States toward Egypt in the mid~l950's. In 1955 Egypt, having failed 
to secure military equipment from the West on.acceptable terms, turned 
to the Soviet bloc for that purpose. The American reaction to.that 
action was an. abrupt termination of aid to Egypt and an attempt to sep= 
.arate and isolate Egypt from its Arab neighbors. A year later, after 
the Suez crisis had greatly enhanced Nasser's prestige, the United 
States reinstated aid to Egypt and sought to re=establish normal rela= 
tions.( 2) 
This change in.the attitudes of the Soviet Union. and the United 
States did not mean the abandoning of the bipolar structure of the Cold 
War; it only meant .the recognition of the existence of countries uncom-
2 
mitted to either bloc. It a:bo implied that each bloc would struggle to 
keep the uncommitted countries from joining the other bloc};. and attempt 
. to absorb them within itself. 
This.thesis attempts to estimate the success or failure of the two 
bloc leaders in.achieving their aims. In order to make this estimate 
(1) Philip E. Mosley, 11 Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries. 11 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1, October, 1964, P• 88. 
( 2) John S. Badeau,. 11U. S. A. and U. A. R.: A Crisis in. Confidence, 11 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Nc:f. 2, January, 1965, p. 285. 
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the voting behavior of caucusing.groups in·the United Nations General 
Assembly on political issues of Cold War significance is studied. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations is a body that reflects 
the political alignments of world politics and mirrors the power struggle 
of the Cold War. According to Robert E. Riggs; 
It would be connnonplace to say that the Assembly is a fattim,:: · 
where states and groups of states seek influence, prestige, 
political advantage, or whatever other values may be at stake. 
More than this, an. extra- legal political structur,e b,as deve-
loped alongside·the formal structure·established by the Charter, 
which reflects the real power alignments and interests in the 
Assembly more ·accurately than the formal organization could. (3.) 
It follows that the 11 real power ,alignments and interests" in the 
Cold War are best reflected when the Assembly is involved in voting on 
political issues of significance to the East-West conflict. 
In order to properly estimate·the success or failure of each bloc 
in reaching the aims of keeping unity in its ranks, preventinguncom-
mitted countries from joining the· opposing bloc 9 and absorbing the uncom-
mitted within its own ranks, it will be necessary to determine whether 
there.have been significant voting realignments in·the United Nations 
! 
General Assembly.(4) It will be necessary to establish which caucusing 
(3) Robert E. Riggs, Politics inthe United Nations. Urbana, Illinois, 
1958, p. 1. 
(4) A "significant" voting realignment is arbitrarily defined as a shift 
away from either·of the superpowers, the United States o:r·the Soviet 
Union, in terms of withdrawing support from one side or the other. 
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groups have shifted, and when the shifts have occured.{1) This info::mna~ 
tion will, in turn, help identify some of the causes of the shifts o 
Since its inception the United Nations has been an institution of 
major importance to American foreignpolicyo At times it has become 
an instrument. of American foreign policy, at other times the setting in 
which that policy has unfolded. In relation to the General Assembly, 
Ernest A. Gross wrote in 1954: 
(5) All of the investigation will be done in terms of caucusing. groups. 
This will be done partially in order to expedite the analysis; 
it will be more convenient to study the·voting behavior ·of nine 
units rather than one hundred a:nd ten.; Another reason is that 
this investigation intends to probe the overall shifts rather than 
.isolated shifts by individual countries. Caucusinggroups have 
been formed primarily to influel'l.ce the formal decisions of the 
various·organs of the United Nations. To.achieve that purpose, 
groups attempt to vote as blocs. In order to vote as blocs they 
.attempt to reach some degree of consensus.among their members 
through meetings and discussioni;.. The importance of this level 
of analysis has been indicated in a number·of works. ·see the 
following references as examples of group analysis: 
Best, Gary, Diplomacy in the United Nations, Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1960. 
Hovet, Jr., Thomas, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 19600 ·-----
Hovet, Jr~, Thomas, 11 United Nations Diplomacy", Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 17; No.: l ," 1963: 
Vincent, Jack Ernest, The.Caucusing Groups of the United 
Nations ~- An Examination of Their AttitudesToward the 
Organization. · UnpublishedPh. D. dissertation, University 
of Oregon, 1964. 
Riggs, Robert E., Politics in _the United Nations, a 
Study qf the United States inf'Iue'nce in the General 
Assembly, Urbana, Illinois, The Univers{ty'.'of Illinois 
Press, 1958. 
Wilcox, Francis Orlando; U. N. and the Nonaligned 
Nations, New York, Foreign Policy Associatii:m, 1962. 
· The American leadership record in ·this forum is a proud one. 
In. the·years 1945 through 1953 .the General Assembly adopted 
over 800 resolutions. The United States was defeated. in 
·less than 3 per cent - and in no case ,where our important 
security interests were involved. In·these eight years only 
two resolutions supported by us failed of aQoption.(6)' 
Other official publications have made s.tatements such as: 
The United States has never been·defeated on any important 
political question 'in· the United Nations. On the other 
hand, the Soviet Union can · usµa l ly · count on only 5. ou.t of 
60 votes (before 1955) in the General Assembly. (7) 
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There has been a great deal of speculation, particularly since the 
mass ·admission,of Asian.and.African 11ations in the period 1955=1957 9 
about the· declining influence of the Uq:hted States in the United Nations. 
Leland M. Goodrich, citing.as causes the development of the.Cold.War 
and the admissio.n of many new Asian. and African states to the United 
Nations, wrote; !!Changed circumstances, however, have in the minds of 
many made the United Nations a :less useful instrument of United States 
foreign ,policy than it initially was. 11 ( S) Vernon V. Aspaturian, , ;~':':::'i..n 
writing in 1957, placed the blame solely on the influx of new--members: 
Conceived as an expedient weapon.of the moment to halt 
·Communist aggression, theAmerican.;.invented "Uniting for 
Peace" resolution permanently shifted the center of grav~ 
ity of the U. N. from the Security'CouncU to the General 
Assembly. This meant.that as long.as the United States 
commanded .automatic majorities in the Assembly, confli.cts 
between .American policy and that o,f the United Nations 
could be kept to a minimum, but with the recent influx of 
ne"'7 members that era is over. (9) 
(6) Ernest A. Gross, 11Why the U.S. Needs the U~N. 11 , Foreign Policy Bulle~ 
tin, Vol. 34, September 15, 1954, p. 2. -
(7) Departmen,t of State, You.and the United Nations, Publication No. 5887, 
International Organization and.Cor1:ference Series Ill, 105, Washington 
o.c., 1955. 
(8) Leland M. Goodrich, 11TheUnited Nations; its Successes .and its Fail .. 
ures, 11 Contemporary Civilization, 1959, p. 125. 
(9) Vernon V. Aspaturian, 11The Metamorphosis of the United Nations", 
Yale Review, Vol. .4fJ~ No. 4, Summer 1957, p. 558. 
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Much of t he discus sion surrounding the weakening of American influ-
ence in the United Nations has been impressionistic. There has been 
little empirica l investigation to verify or rejec t these impressions. 
One basic purpose of this investigation to to fill that gap. 
Methodology 
To accomplish the purposes of the thesis the following method will 
be used: the voting behavior of individual nations on five substantive 
political issues of every plenary session of the General Assembly from 
1956 to 1963 will be recorded in terms of coincidence with the voting 
behavior of the United States, the voting behavior ·of the Soviet Union, 
or abstention. Those issues will be chosen that are substantive and have 
a distinctly political character. For example, the five issues chosen 
for the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly (1959) are: Resolu-
tion 1239, Representation of China; Resolution 1353, Question of Tibet; 
Resolution 1454, Question of Hungary; Resolution 1455, Question of 
Korea; Resolut i on 1441 , U. N. Emergency Force. 
To record the voting behavior of individual states, this form will 
be followed: 
+1 for coincidence with the u. S. 
-1 for coincidence with the U, S.S. R, 
O for abstention 
Examine the following pattern: 
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XIII Session (1958) 
Resolutions(lO) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Individual To~al 
Urugua.y +l +l +l +1 +1 = +5 
Venezuela +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 = +5 
Afghanistan -1 0 0 0 0 = -1 
Albania -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 = -5 
Bulgaria -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 = -5 
Burma -1 0 0 +l 0 = 0 
Byelorussia -1 -1 .. 1 -1 ;..l = .:.5 
Cambodia -1 0 0 +1 0 = 0 
Even though this pattern is only representative of one session, 
yet it is fairly indicative of the political alignment. of each state. 
·The three states with scores of .:.5 --i.e. Albania, Bulgaria, and 
Byelorussian s. S. R. -·· are members of the Soviet Bloc, and vote con-
sistently with the Soviet Unio~. The two states with scores of +5 --
i.e. Uruguay and Venezuela -- .are members of the Latin American Qrpup, 
and vote almost consistently with the U.S. The two states with scores 
of zero -- Burma and Cambodia, both members of the Afro-Asian Grollp --
consider themselves neutralists. Afghanistan, scoring a -1, is also a 
member·of the Afro-Asian Group and is· considered a neutralist nation 
·which·leans toward the u. s. s. R. 
As was noted earlier in this study, caucusing groups, not indivi-
dual states, will be the basic units. A caucusing group, according to 
Thomas Hovet, Jr., is 11 ••• ·a term applied to any group of states which 
(10) See Appendix for title of resolutions. 
has some degree of formal organization, holds fairly regular meetings, 
and is concerned with substantive and procedural matters.u(ll ) Hovet 
lists eleven groups and one bloc in existence at the U. N. ~s of 
December, 1962 .< 12) The ·caucusing groups are the Afro-AsianGroup, 
the African Group, t he Arab Group, the Benelux Group, the European 
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Community Group, the Brazzavi l l e Group , the Casablanca Group, the Common-
wealth Group, the Latin American Group, the Scandinavian Group, and the 
Western European Group. The Soviet Bloc is the only bloc.(13) 
\ 
The African Group consists. of : 32 states: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroun, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), 
Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, 
Malagasy, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tog.o, Tunisia, Uganda, United 
Arab Republic, Upper Volta.< 14) 
(11) Thomas Hovet, Jr., "United Nations Diplomacy", Journal of Inter-
nat ional Affairs, Vol. .17~ , No. I, 1963, P• 37. 
(12) Hovet define a bloc as 11 ••• a group of states which meets regularly 
in caucus, the members of which are bound by their votes in the 
United Nations by the caucus decision; the Soviet Bloc is the only 
bloc." ibid. PP• 35-~7. 
(13) Ibid. p. 37. In this study the Benelux Group, The Casablanca 
Group, and the Brazzaville Group will be excluded. The Benelux 
Group will be excluded because of its very small size which makes 
any kind of group analysis meaningless. The three countries, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and Netherlands, will be treated along with Italy and 
France in the European Community Group. Any meaningful dynamic ana-
lysis of the voting behavior of the Brazzaville and Casablanca Groups 
will also be impractical because these two groups did not come into 
being until very late in the time period covered by this study. 
(14) All the information concerning the memberships of the groups is 
from Hovet 1 s chart, Ibid. p. 36. 
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The Afro .. Asian Group consists of 55 states: .Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Bu~a, Burundi, .Cambod-i8, Cameroun, Central African Republi«i:., Ceylon, 
Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ira~, Iraq, Iv,ory Coast, ;Japan, 
Jordan, Lao~, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy, Malaya, :Mali, Ma,uritania, 
Mongolia, ;Morocco, Nepal, N.i,ger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Phil,ii:\1'-nes, R~anda, 
~audi Ar.abia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, SOID:alia, Sudan, Syria, Tang.anyil<a, 
Tha·iland, · Togo, . Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, .United Arab Repub lie, Upper 
Volta, Yeme.n. 
The Arab Group- consists of· 12 states: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocc<?, .Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United 
.. A.rab Republic, Yemei::i. 
The Comm.onweal.th Group consists .of 16 s~ates: Australia, c;anada, 
Cey~on, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Malaya, New Zealand,. Nigeria, 
Pakis\:an, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Trini.dad - ·Tobag.o, Ug.anda, United 
Kingdom. 
The E;uropean · Community Gr.cup cons is ts of 5 states: Be lg.i.um., :France, 
Italy, Luxembourg., Net:heriands. 
The J;,atin .American Group. consists of 20· ·states: Argentina, .Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, :Colombia,, Costa Rica, Cuba(l5 ), Dominican Republic, Ecµador, 
El Salvador, Gµatemala, Haiti, Hondur,as, Mex.fco, Nicarag1,1a, Panama, 
Parag~ay, Peru, Uraguay, Venezuela. 
( 15) Despite the expuls.icm o·f Cuba from· the: Organization of American 
States in 19-62, the Latin .American Group has not followed this 
decision. .Rather, the· Group has evaded· decisive action, on the 
issue by not inviUng Cuba to in.formal caucusing, sessions. Ibid. 
p. 36. 
The Scandinavian Group consists of 5 states: Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Swed~n. 
The Soviet Bloc has 10 members: Albania, Byelorussia, Bulg.ari a, 
Czechoslavakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, 
Ukraine. 
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The ·Western European Group Consists of 19 states: Austria, Be l gium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portusal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, Yugoslavia. 
ln · order to find out whether there have been significant voting 
realignments in the General Assembly this procedure will be followed: 
each nation's votes will be calculated in terms of the group or groups 
with which that nation caucuses. The score representing the voting beha-
vior of a .group on .a single issue in one session of the General Assembly 
will be called the Group Score. For example, if ina particular session 














the Group Score will be the algebraic sum -of the individual scores divi-
ded by the number of members in the group; 
+5/6 = +0.83 
In every session there will be five Group Scores for each group. The 
11 
·five G:rollp Scores.wtU yield the Yearly Group. Scor.e!;!. This will be done 
by dividing the algeb:raic sum. of .the Group Sc9res by .five-, -the number :of 
issues. · For·example, if a group's Group_Scores for.a particuiar session 
were: 
· -;t:ssue 1 +o~83 
ls sue 2 +o. 77 
Issue- 3 +1.00 
Issue·4 +0.90 
Issue 5 ,+0.95 
the Yearly Group~Score of that group ·woul~ be; 
+4.45/5 =:= +o·.a9 
An overall view· of the changes in·.Yea:tly Groµp Scores would indi-
cate whether there-have been significant voting realignments. 
There will be nine graphs to show the- .voting behavior af groups 
· aver .. a period· of eight years. The horizont,al coordit:tate of :each graph 
will indicate the sessions of the General Assembly, and the vertical-
coo:J.""dinate w.111 indicate the voting 1:>ehav:io:r of the group in, tex,ns of 
coincidenee- With the Uni~ed States, the _Sovie·t ·Union,. or_. abstentio.n. 
· For example, H the· Yearly Groups.cores o-f a group: are: 
Session .·.xI +1.00 
II XII +o.80 
II XIII +o.40 
II XIV .o.oo 
II xv +o.20 
II XVI . +o.80 
II XVII +1.00 
II XVIII · +o •. 60 
They -would be indic,ated on: the graph in· this I!lanner: 
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Sessions 





Finally, by relating, this information to various factors and deve-
lopments beyond the f.ramework of the United Nations, it may be possible 
to make. some ge·neralizations ·as to the causes of the voting realignments. 
Chapter ·Procedure 
After·the introductory chapter·there·will be one chapter devoted 
to the.analysis of the voting·shifts in the United Nations General Assem-
·bly on issues of.Cold War.significance. This·chapter will consist of 
eleven sections. In the first section of the se,cond chapter there will 
be a t;able representing the voting behavior of countries·without group 
classifications. In this.table the Yearly Scores, rather than Issue 
.Scores, will be recorded. This t;able will also include the Yearly 
Scores of the four rroncaucusing countries, the United 8tates, Republic 
. of South Africa, China, and Israel. For purposes of comparison with 
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~he· voting behavior of groups the voting·behavior of the entire General 
Assembly·will be .illustrated on.a graph. 
Each o_f the next nine sectioris will be devoted to one caucJ.1sing 
groµp. At the.beginning,of each of the first :nine. sections there will 
- be a short introductory note describing the background and c91Uposit,ion 
of a caucusing ,group and a brief description.of the voting. behavior qf that 
caucusing group on :the selected. issues in. the period under study. The. 
intr9ductory note. will be followed by a tabl.e repres.eq.ting, the voting 
behavior of the metnbers Qf the .group on -:the five select.ed issues per 
year fe:,r the eight years under study. Then, the Grol;lp. Score wilLbe 
taken on every issue, .and a .Yea:i:ly ·Group Score on every year. The voting 
behavior of :t.he group over the .eight ye.ar peri.od will then, be. illustrated 
on.a graph. 
In·the·eleventh secti'on .. of the second chapter there-will be.a sum-
. mary note .describing. the voting. shifts of all the gr:oups. 
The third and final chapter will deviate from the methodolog.y uti-
lized in the second chapter in .order to. relate the voting shifts des-
cribed in the second chapter to the trends in-the Cold War· conflict, and 
to generalize: about the causes of the s~ifts. 
CHAPTER II 
THE VOTING SHIFTS 
The General Assembly Qollectively 
In the last session ~f the.United Nations General Assembly studied 
in this thesis there were one hundred and ten:countries which toqk part 
in voting on the five selected issues. 
Table I lists all the c.ountries and.their vot:ing behavior in alpha-
betical order without reference to group classifications. In-this table 
the Yearly Scores, rather than Issue Scor,es, of the countries are rec.orded. 
Included in this table are the.Yearly Scores of the four non-caucusing 
countries, the United States, Republic of South Afric_a, China; and Israel. 
For purposes of comparison with the voting behavior of groups. the 
vottng behavior of the entir-e General Assembly is illustrated in Figure 
1. Figure 1, which utilizes the Net Yearly Sc.ores of the General Assem-
bly, indicates .that the overall support for the American position on 
political issues .of Gold War signif.icance declined steadily between the 
years 1956; and 1963. In 1956 the Net Yearly Score of the General Assem-
bly was +0.52. In 1963 that. score stood at +0.22, an. all"'time low. 
The African Caucusing Group 
The Afric.an caucusing groµp came into being in 1958, as a result 




THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY GOLLECT:j:VELY 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 · 1963 
XI XII XIII XIV xv XVI XVII XVIII 
Afghanistan .+l 0 .,.1 =l ... 2 =l 0 ·-2 
Albania -5 ..,5 -5 :;,.5 =5 -5 .. 5 .;.5 
Algeria -1 ;...2 
. Argent:ina +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 .+5 +5 :+3 
Aust.ralia +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 '+5 +5 +5 
Austria +5 +5 +3 +4 +4 +4 +4 +2 
Belgium . +5 +5 +5 ·. +4 +3 ·+5 +4 +5 
Bolivia +5 +5 +3 +4 +4 +5 +5 +2 
Brazil +5 +5 +5 +5 '+5 +5 +5 +l 
Bulgaria ... 5 -5 .:, ;,.5 -5 .. 5 -5 :;,,5 .. 5 
~Urtl!,8 . +3 +l 0 0 0 0 .o ;.;·2 
Burundi 0 .,.2 
.Byelorussian SSR ... 5 -5 =5 .:...5 -5 · .. 5 -5 ..,5 
··Cambodia +3 +l 0 0 .;.l 0 0 .. 2 
Cameroon +2 +4 +3 +3 
· Canada +5 . +5 +5 +5 +4 '+5 +5 +5 
Cent.ral African Rep. 0 +4 +3 +3 
Ceylon +2 +l .;.i +l -2 ... 1 0 .. 2 
·Chad +3 +3 ·+2 +3 
. Chile +4 +3 +5 +4 +5 +5 +5 +3 
· Columbia +5 +5 +5 +5 +4 +5 +5 +3 
Col).go(Braz) 0 +l , +3 +2 
Congo (Leop) +2 +3 +2 +3 
Costa Rica +4 +4 +5 +3 +4 +5 +5 +4 
C-µba +3 +4 +5 +3 .. 3 .;.5 ..,.4 .,;4 ·, 
.Cyprus +3 +4 +3 +3 
Czechovlavakia .;."5 ;..5 -5 .. -s.· -5 ~5 -5 .... 5 
· P.ali:ome,y +l +5 +3 +2 
Denmark . +3 +3 +2 +3 +3 +3 +3 ·+2 
·Dominican Rep. +4 .+5 ,+5 +4 +3 +5 .+~ .:+4 
Ecuador +4 +2 +5 +5 +3 +3 +4 +4 
El Salvador +4 +4 +5 +4 +4 +5 +5 +5 
Ethiopia +4 +4 +3 +l 0 0 0 ... 1 
fed. of Malaya +3 +5 +5 . +3 +5 +4 +4 
Finland +1 0 0 0 +l .;,.l 0 0 
France +5 +5 +4 +4 +3 +3 +2 +4 
G.a:b.on +2 +2 +2 +2 
. Ghana +l 0 +l'" 0 .. 2 .1 0 -2 
Greece +5 +5 . +3 +5 +5 . +5 +5 +5 
Guatemala +4 +4 +5 +4 +4 +5 +5 +5 
Guinea .;.4 -2 .. 2 .,.1 
Hai~i +5 +5 +5 +4 +3 +5 +5 +2 
Honduras +4 +5 +5 +5 +4 +4 +5 +4 
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TABLE' I (Continued) 
;956 ~957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 ,' 1963 
,XI. XII Xll.l 'XIV xv XVI XVII XVIII 
Hungary ..;5 .;.5 ..;.5 .. 5 -5 --5 .. 5 -5 : 
· Iceland +5 +5 +4 +4 +4 +5 +4 +2 
India 
, 
+l +l ... 1 0 .. 2 0 3 0 
Indonesia +l +l -1 0 -2 1,,.2 -0 ... 2 
Iran +5 +5 +5 +5 +4 +5 +5 +3 
Iraq +5· +4 ' ;. l .;.1 -2 .. 2 ;,.1 .. 2 
ll"'eland +5 +2 +3. +3 +2 +5 +5 +5 
·· Israel +3 +3 +2 +3 +4 +4 -1-4 +2 
Italy +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 
Ivory Coast +l +3 +2 _._+3 
Jamaica +4 +4 
Japan +l +4 +4 +5 +5 +5 +5 +4 
Jordan +2 +5 .+5 +3 +3 +4 +2 0 
,Laos +3 +4 +4 +5 +2 +5 +l 0 
Lebanon +3 +3 +2 +l +l +2 +l +l 
Liberia +5 ;+4 +4 +4 +4 +4 +4 +2 
. Li'~ya +3 +4 0 0 +l +2 .. +2 +l 
Luxembaurg +4 +5 :+5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 
:Malagasy +l +4 +3 +2 
Mali ,' ... 2 -Z: ..;,l .. 3 
Mauritan~a '+4 +2 +2 
Mexico +4 .+4 +5 +4 +2 +4 +5 +3 
· Mongolia ...-5 .,.5 ' ... 5 
Morocco +4 0 =l ;,.l -4 -1 ' ... 1 -~3 
Nepal +2 0 +l 0 +l ..;.,l 0 ~1 
Netherlands +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +4 +4 
New Ze.aland +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +4 
Nicar11g~a +4 +5 +4 +4 +5 '' +5 +5 '+3 
.N.iger +l +4 +3 +2 
· Nigeria +3 +l +l 0 
Norway +3 . +3 +3 . +3 +3 +3 +3 +2 
P ak::i;.s t;a n +5 +3 -+5 .• +5 +4 +3 +3 0 
:Panama +4 +4 +5 +5 '+.s- +5 +4 +3 
Paraguay·_ +3 +5 +!? +5 +5 ,' +5 +5 +3 
Pert,1' · '+5 +5 +4 +5 +4 .+5 +5 +3 
Phil lipines +4 +5 t5 -t-5 '+4 +5 +5 .• +4 
Poland .. 4 -5 .;.5 ~5 :-5 -5 :--5 .:.,5 ; 
:+i Portugal • +3 +4 +4 +3 +3 +2 -0 
Romania .;,.~ ~5 ~5 .;.5 ... 5 -5 ~5 ... 5 
·Rwanda ;+3 +3 
Saudi Arabia +l +l 0 0 0 +l -1 .. 1 
Senegal +3 +3 +2 +l 
Sierra L~<me +2 0 +i 
Somalia +2 0 0 .o 
South Africa +3 0 +5 +4 +4 +4 +3 +3 
Spain +5 +5 +5 +4 +3 +4 +4 +4 
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TABLE I (Con~ip.ued) 
1956 1957 '1958 :1959 '1960 : 1961 ·. 19&2 1963 
XI XII XIII XIV xv XVI ·XVII. ,·XVIII 
· Sudan +4 0 0 ... 1 -o 0 .. 1 -2 
Sweqen · +3 +3 +2 +3' +l +3 +3 +l 
Syria 0 0 .,.,1 ..... 2 ;,,;-3 
Tang.anyika 0 0 .;.l 
Thailand +5 +5 :+5 +5 +5 .: +5 +5 -+5 
Togo +l +l ' +l +3 
Trinidad &.·.To.bago +4 +3 
Tunisia +3 +3 .+4 +3 +3 0 0 .. 1 
Turkey +4 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 
·,Uganda ..-1 0 
ukrainian SSR --5 ... 5 .5 -5 -5 ... 5 ... 5 ;..5 
. u. s • s-. R. .• 5 -5 ... 5 -5 :-5 _ .. 5 .... 5 .. 5 
United Arab Rep. 0 0 -1 ;..1 ·-2 · ... 1 -1 ..,3 
United. •Ki,ngdom +5 +5 +5 +4 +5 +5 +3 +3 
· United States +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 +5 
Upper Volta +l +3 +2 +2 
Uruguay +5 +5 ;+5 .+5 +5 +5 +5 +3 
Venezuela ·+5 +5 +5 +4 +3 +5 +5 +4 
Yemen 0 0 ..; 1 · .. ,..1 , .. 2 .;1 +2 .;.2 
·Yugoslavia .;.2 0 -2 0 .. 2 ..;2 .;.2 ;,.3 
NET 0 YEARLY SCORES +o.52 +0.49 .~.46 +o.44 +oD2 +o.42 +9.37 . +0.22 
+o.s 
-0.5 
.. 1.0 .. 
XI 
Figure 1. The Voting Beh:avior of .the General. Assembly 
·Collectively. 





conference was to "produce .an African identity and personality in inter~ 
national affairs."(l) 
In 1958 the African caucusing group consisted of eight countries: 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, ~Mot;oc.t.tl,,, Sudan, Tunisia,. and the United 
Arab Republic. By 1963 the number had grown·to thirty 0 two. This large 
increase in the number of African states in the United Nations did not, 
however, bring.about.a c;:orresponding increase in the influence of the 
African caucusing group in. that body. Ideological differences among the 
African states caused a .division within the African group, which was 
manifested by·the formation of two factions, the Brazzaville group and 
the Casablanca group. 
The Brazzaville group consists of Cameroun, Central·African Repub-
lie, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and U'pper Volta. This group w:as·formally 
. organized at the opening of the Sixteenth Session of the Gen~ral As~embly 
in September, .1961. The Brazzaville group had previously operated inf or-
mally from September, 1960. until September, 1961. One of the first 
decisions of this group, which served to set it.apart .from·the Casablanca 
group, was the endorsementof the French position on Algeria in opposition 
to the F. L. N. The Brazzaville group consists entirely of former French 
colonies, and it·appears to be more Western .. oriented than the Casablanca 
group.(2) 
The Casablanca group was formed by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, 
and the United Arab Republic in January, 1961. This group was formed 
(1) Ghana, "Draft Memorandum Conference of African States", as cited 
in Hovet, Bloc .Politics in the United Nations, p. 94 • 
. (2) Hovet, Africa in the United Nations, PP• 91 .. 98. 
partly in reaction·to the views of Brazzaville states on Algeria, the 
Congo, and Mauritania, and partly because its members had a more mili~ 
tant attitude respecting African·issues and a concept of nop.alignment 
in the East~West conflict.(3 ) 
Ever·since their inception these tw~ groups have been modifying 
their attitudes toward the international political situation. This 
continual process of modification has brought the two groups closer 
to each other. The Brazzaville states, in response to the demands of 
20 
the more radical groups at home, have moved toward a posture more chacter• 
istic·of Africanneutralism. The Casablanca states, because of the real 
demands .of the problems of state-building, have become more moderate in 
their attitudes toward the West.( 4) 
The.Afro .. Asian Caucusing Group 
The.Afro-As:j..an· caucusing group consists of fifty-five members, 
almost half of the total u. N. membership. Prior to 1950 most of the 
Asian~African members of the United Nations were .Arab states which had 
their own·caucusing grpup. Since 1950 there has been a steady increase 
in the·number of non°Arab, Asian~African members of the United Nations. 
The common· intere,ts of these members, coupled with their oppos.itio11 
to the domination of the United Nations by the Western Europeans and . 
the Latin Americans, caused the formationof a formal African"'Asian 
caucusing group to. replace th~ former ad hoc Arab-Asian group. The -- ·.......--
(3) Ibid., PP• 98=100. 
(4) Robert C. Good, 11 Changing Patterns of African International Rela-
tions", The American Political Science Review, Vol. :·5s;:.:1jo;.-: 
3, September· 1964, ppo 6J2..;64lo 
TABLE II 
THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE AFRICAN CAUCUSING GROUP 
Session XIII - 1958 Session XIV - 1959 Session XV - 1960 Session XVI - 1961 Session XVII - 1962 Session XVIII - 1963 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Algeria 0 -1 0 0 0 +l -1 -1 0 -1 
Burundi +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 -1 0 -1 
Cameroun 0 0 0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l +1 -1 
Central.African Rep. 0 0 +l -1 Q +l 0 +l +l +l +l +1 +l 0 0 +l +l +1 +l -1 
Chad 0 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +1 0 +l +1 0 0 +1 +l +1 +1 -1 
Congo (Braz.) 0 0 0 -1 +l +1 0 0 0 0 +l +1 +1 0 0 +1 +1 0 +l -1 
Congo (Leep,) +1 +1 0 +1 0 0 +1 +l +l +l 0 0 0 +l +1 +l +1 -1 
Dahomey 0 0 +1 -1 +l +1 +l +l +1 +1 +l +l +l 0 0 +l +1 0 +1 -1 
Ethiopia +1 +l 0 0 +1 0 0 0 0 +1 -1 0 0 +l 0 -1 0 0 0 +l +1 -1 0 0 0 +1 0 -l o·, -1 
Gabon 0 +1 +l ..-1 +l 0 0 0 +1 +l 0 +l +l 0 0 +1 +l +l 0 -1 
Ghana -1 0 0 0 0 ---1 0 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 +1 -1 0 0 0 +l -1 -1 0 -1 
Guinea -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 +l -1 0 0 -1 
Ivory Coast 0 0 +l -l +1 +l 0 +l +1 0 0 +1 +l 0 0 +l +1 +1 +l -1 
Liberia +l +l +1 +1 0 +1 +l 0 +l +l +l +l_ +1 +1. 0 +l 0 +l +1 +l +1 +1: +1: o: +1 +1 +1 0 +1 -1 
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 +1 0 0 0 +1 +1 +l 0 0 0 +1 +1 0 0 -1 
Madagascar 0 0 +l -1 +1 +1 0 +l +l +1 +1 +l :tl 0 0 0 +1 +1 +l -1 
Mali -1 0 .0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 
Mauritania +1 0 +1 +1 +l 0 +l +l 0 0 +1: 0 +l. +l. -l 
Morocco -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 
Niger 0 0 +1 -1 +l +l 0 +1 +l +l +1 +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 +1 -1 
Nigeria +l 0 +l +l 0 0 0 0 0 +1 +l 0 0 0 0 +l 0 0 0 -1 
Rwanda +1 +1 +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l -1 
Senegal -1 +l +1 +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l 0 0 0 +l +l 0 0 -1 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 +l +l +l -1 0 0 0 +1 0 0 -1 -1 
Somalia 0 0 +l +l 0 0 0 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 +l -1 
Sudan -1 0 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -l·· +1 -1 +l 0 -1 0 0 0 +1 0 -1 0 0 0 +l -1 -1 0 -1 
Tanganyika 0 0 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 -1 
Togo 0 0 +l +l -1 0 0 0 0 +l +l 0 0 0 0 +l +l +l +l -1 
Tunisia 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +1 +l 0 0 +l +l +l 0 -1 0 0 0 +1 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 -1 
Uganda 0 -1 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 
United Arab Rep. -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 .. 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 
Upper Volta 0 0 0 +l 0 +l 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 +l -1 











-l.di1I ••••••••1 XI XII XIII XIV xv 
Sessions 
XVI XVII XVIII 
·kExplanatory note.: The line plotted by circles indicates the voting 
pattern of the General Assembly, while the line plotted by squares denotes 
the voting pat.tern of the caucusing group on this and succeeding figures, 
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formal African-Asian group in its present form came into being after 
the Bandung Conference in 1955, and began·operating at the start of the 
Xth Session.( 5 ) 
The Afro-Asian group includes most of the poorer and less deve-
l9ped countries .of the world which contain almost half of the world 1 s 
population. These countries·have one major thing in common, their 
hatred of imperialism and colonialism in.any form. On the other hand, 
there are many divisive.factors within the group. These divisive fac-
tors range from border disputes and traditional enmities between states 
to radically different positions on Cold War issues. Therefore, it 
cannot be expected that the group showa strongly cohesive vote, and 
it does not. 
The important function of the Afro-Asian group is to bring its 
members together formally so that those having special interests in 
·common can consult conveniently. There are two formal caucusing groups, 
the Arab group and the African·group, plus a few other factions within 
the Afro ... Asian group. Therefore, the Afro-Asiangroup is more of a 
discussion group than a group for making tactical and strategic deci-
sions.(6) 
The voting record of the Afro-Asian group shows that it supported 
the U.S. position more than the Arab group and the African group, but 
less than the whole General Assembly. Since the Arabs and the Africans 
are also members of the Afro ... Asian group, it is obvious that the non-
Arab Asians supported the U.S. position on political issues more than 
the rest of the group. 
(5) Hovet, Bloc Politics in.the United Nations, pp. 85.,.86. 
(6) Ibid. 
TABLE III 
THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE AFRO-ASJAN.CAUCUSING GROUP 
Session XI .. 1936 Session XII .. 1957 Session Xiii .. 1958 Session XIV ... llJ.)IJ .Session :XV .. llJbU Session .XVI - 1§61 Session XVII - 1962 Session XVIII - 1963 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) \S)· (l) (2) i3) (4) (5) 
Afghanistan 0 -1 +l 0 +l -l 0 0 0 +l -l 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 -l -l 0 0 0 0 +l -l 0 0 0 +l -l -1 0 .1 
Algeria 0 -1 0 0 0 +l -l -l 0 -l 
Burma +l -1 +l +l +l -l 0 0 +l +l -l 0 0 +l 0 -1 0 +l 0 0 -l 0 0 +l 0 -1 0 0 0 +l +l .1 0 0 0 0 -l -l 0 0 
Burundi +l -l 0 0 0 +l -l -l 0 -l 
Cambodia +l 0 0 +l +l 0 0 +l 0 0 -l 0 0 +l 0 -l ·O +l 0 0 -l 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 +l +l .1 0 0 0 +l -l .1- 0 -1 
Cameroun 0 0 0 +l +l +1 0 +1 +l +l +l - +1 +l 0 0 +l +1 +l +l -l 
Central African Rep. ·O 0 +l -l 0 +l 0 +l +l 0 +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l -1 
Ceylon 0 -l +l +l +l -1 0 0 +l +l ~1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 +l 0 +l -l 0 0 0 -l -1 -1 0 0 +l +l a1 0 0 0 +l -1 -l 0 .1 
Chad 0 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +l 0 +l +l 0 ,o +l +l +l +l .1 
Congo (Braz.) 0 0 0 -1 +l +l 0 0 0 0 +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 +l -1 
Congo ( Leop. ) 0 +l +l 0 0 +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l 0 0 0 +l +l +l +l -1 
Cyprus 0 0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l .1 
DahOII'ey 0 0 +l .1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 +l -1 
Ethiopia +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 +l -l 0 0 +l 0 -1 0 0 0 +l +l -1 0 0 0 +l 0 -1 0 .1 
Gabon 0 +l +l -l +l 0 0 0 +l +l 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l 0 .1 
Ghana +l 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0. 0 0 -l o. +L 0 0 -l. 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 -1 0 -l 
Guinea -l -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 .1 0 +l -1 0 0 -1 
India 0 -1 +l 0 +l -1 0 0 +l +l -1 0 0 0 0 -l 0 +l 0 0 -l 0 0 0 -l -1 0 0 0 +l +l -l +l +l +l +l -1 0 +l -l 
Indonesia 0 -l +l 0 +l -1 0 ·o +l +l -l 0 0 0 0 -1 0 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 •l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 -1 0 -1 
Iran +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l •O +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 
Iraq +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 
Ivory Coast 0 0 +l -1 +l +l 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l -1 
Japan +l 0 0 0 0 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l 0 
Jordan +l 0 +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l -1 +l +l 0 +l 0 +l 0 0 -1 
Laos +l 0 0 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l -1 +l 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 
Lebanon +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 +l +l 0 +l 0 +l 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 +l 0 -1 +l 0 +l 0 0 0 +l +l 0 0 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 
Liberia +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l 0 +1- +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +I 0 +l -1 
Libya +l 0 +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o· 0 0 +l 0 +l 0 0 0 +l +l +l 0 0 0 +l +I 0 0 -1 
Malagasy 0 0 +l -1 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 0 +l +l +l -1 
Malaya +l +1 +l 0 0 +l +l +1 +1 +l +l +1 +l +l +l 0 +1 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +1 +1 0 +1 +l +l H. +I +1 +1 0 
Mali -l 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 0 .n -1 0 -1 
Mauritania +1 0 +1 +l +1 0 +1 +1 0 0 +l O• +l +l -1 
Mongolia -1 -l -1 -1 -1 -l -l -1 -1 -l -1 .1 -1 -1 -1 
Morocco +l +1 +l 0 +1 -l 0 +1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -l 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 0 .1 -1 0 -1 
Nepal 0 -l +l +l +1 -1 0 0 +l 0 -1 0 .0 +l +1 -l 0 0 +1 0 -l 0 0 +l +1 -1 0 0 0 0 +1 -1 0 0 0 +1 .1 0 0 .1 
Niger 0 0 +1 -1. +1 +l 0 +1 +1 +1 +l +1 +l 0 0 +1 +l 0 +1 -l 
Nigeria -1 0 +l +l 0 0 0 0 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 0 . +1 0 0 0 ~l 
Pakistan +1 +l +l +1 +l 0 +l +l 0 +1 +l +l +l +l +1 +l +l +l +1 +l +1 +l +1 +! 0 0 +l +1 0 +1 +1 -l +l +l +l +1 .1 0 +l. -1 
Phillipines +1 +1 0 +1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 +l +1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 +l +1 +l +1 +l +1 +l +l +l +1 +l +l +1 0 
Rwanda +1 ·+1 +1 0 0 +1 +l +l +l -l 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 +l -1 +l 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 
Senegal -1 +l +l +l +l +l' 0 0 +l +l +l +l 0 0 0 +l +l 0 0 -1 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 +l +l +l -1 0 0 0 +l 0 0 ·+l -1 
Somalia 0 0 +l +l 0 0 0 0 0 0 +l -l 0 0 0 +l -1 0 +l -1 
Sudan +l -1 +l 0 +l -1 0 0 +1 0 -l 0 +l 0 0 -l 0 0 0 0 ~1 +l 0 +l 0 -1 0 o· 0 +l 0 .1 0 0 0 +l .1 -1 0 -1 
Syria 0 -1 +l 0 0 -l 0 0 +l 0 -l 0 0 0 0 -l -l 0 0 0 0 .1 -1 0 -1 
Tanganyika .0 .0 .0 0 .0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 -1 
Thailand +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l .+l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 +l +l ·'+l 
Togo 0 0 +1 +l -1 0 0 0 0 +l H 0 0 0 0 +l +l +l +l -1 
Tunisia +l 0 +l 0 +l 0 +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l 0 ,+l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l 0 -1 0 0 0 +l +l -1 0 0 ,,o +l -1 0 0 -1 
Turkey +1 +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l . +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 +1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Uganda .0 -1 0 0 0 +! -1 0 0 0 
United Arab Rep. 0 -1 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 +l 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 .o 0 0 0 - .1 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 - -1 0 0 0 0 -l -1 0 -1 
Upper Volta 0 0 0 +l 0 +l 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 0 +l +l 0 +l .1 
Yemen 0 -1 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 +l 0 -l 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -0 -1 0 0 0 o_ 0 +l +l 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 
YEARLY GROUP SCORES +o.52 +o.46 +o.27 +o.33 +o.07 +o.30 +o.27 +o.09 
N 
+'" 
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The Arab Caucusing (ko.up 
The.Arab caucusing group is one of the.few such groups thathas 
been in existence during the entire.course of the history of the General 
Assembly; it b.egan operating ,:as ,an ·interest group at the San Fra:p.cisco 
Conference. Its organizational nucleus· was the. Pact of the L~a.gue of 
Arab States, :which-was signed at:a conference.in·Cairo,on·March 22, 1945 
byEgypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria,·Trans..-Jordan (now µordan), 
and Yemen. All .the members of the Arab League, except Yemen and Jordaq., 
were charter members of the. United Nations. Yemen. did not-become. a mem-
· ber -of .the· Un;i.ted ~at ions, and consequently ,a .member· .of the Ai:ab cau-
cusing group, until 1947. _Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia joined 
the group in 1955, and Sudan became.a member in 1956. 'The. admission 
of Algeria to the .United Naticms in 1962 raised the number of members 
tothe presex:it twelve.(7) 
Theunification of Egypt and Syria into the.United.Arab Republic 
·early in 1958, which included the unification of their .foreign,offices, 
for· a time reduced the Arab vote by ·one. The r.·eadmission of Syria .to 
the Vnited ~ations after·· .the re-partition. of the original United. Arab 
Republic raised the voting:membership of the Arab cauc:using group back 
to- eleven in ·.1961. In order to, avoid cot:1.fusion, Egypt. is listed as 
Uni.ted -Arab Republic · .throughout this study. 
The A:r;ab,;caucusing group has been fairly ·effective -in :presenting 
.. a united front to the Assembly. This group is one· of. the most active 
caucusing<gr.oups in terms of regularity of meetings and p.lanned tactics. 
(7) Hovet, · Bloc Politics in "t'l1e United :Nations,_ p. 5,6. 
27 
The main reason for the high degree of·votingcohesion in the.Arab cau~ 
cusing· group is perhaps the common problem of Israel, and the prolonged 
attention of the United Nations to.that problem.(8) 
The voting record of the Arab group on political issues of Cold 
War significance indicates that this group had au. S. support score of 
+0.43 in 1956, and a U.S. support score of +0.36 in 1957, but from 
1958 to 1962 it dropped to a steady score of zero. ·supporting neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union. In 1963 theµ. S. supportscore 
of the.Arab group dropped to ~0.28, making that group the first, outside 
the Soviet Bloc, to support the Soviet .Union more than the United States. 
The Connnonwealth Caucusing Group 
The Connnonwealth caucusing group is basically a consultation group. 
It is not concerned with.agreeing on connnon·policies because its members 
have very little inconnnon except thetr·historic association with Great 
I 
:Britain, and they belong t¢ a number of other.groups. The meetings 
of .the Conunonwealth group therefore provide an informal means of expres-
sing.different points .of view.( 9 ) 
A study of the overall voting behavior-of the Commonwealth caucus-
ing.group indicates very little because this group does not. represent 
.a specific outiook, a connnon problem, or a particular culture. The 
only valid generalization that·can.bedrawn on the basis of its voting 
behavior is that its 'support for the U. S. position has declined as its 
(8) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 58. 
(9) Hovet, 11 United Nations Diplomacy", Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, 1963, P• 37. 
TABLE IV 
THE VOTING BEHAVIOR .OF THE ARAB CAUCUSING GROUP 
Session XI - 1956 Session XII - 1957 Session XIII .. 1958 Session XIV - 1959 Session XV - 1960 Session XVI - 1961 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (l) (4) (5) 
Algeria 
Iraq +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 
Jordan +1 0 +1 0 0 +1 +l +l +1 +l +l +1 +1 +1 +1 +l +1 0 0 +1 +l 0 0 +1 +l +l 0 +1 +l +l 
Lebanon +l .+1 0 0 +1 +l 0 +l +1 0 +l 0 +l 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 +l 0 -1 +l 0 +1 0 0 0 +l 
Libya +1 0 +l 0 +1 +l +l +l +l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +l 0 +l 0 0 0 +l 
Morocco +l +l +I 0 +l -I 0 +1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 0 +l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1 -1 +l 0 0 0 0 
Sudan +l -1 +l 0 +1 .1 0 0 +1 0 -1 0 +1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 +l 0 +1 0 -1 0 0 0 +l 
Syria 0 -1 +1 0 0 -1 0 0 +1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia +l 0 +I 0 +I 0 +I +l +l 0 0 +1 +I +1 +l 0 +I +I +l 0 -0 +1 +l +I 0 -1 0 0 0 +I 
U. A. R. 0 -1 +1 0 0 -1 0 0 +1 0 -1 0 ·O 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -I -1 0 0 0 0 
Yemen 0 -I +I 0 0 -1 0 0 +1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 
YEARLY GROUP SCORES +-0.43 +-0.36 +-0.01 o.oo o.oo o.oo 
Seas ion XVII ... 1962 
(1) (2) (l) (4) (5) 
0 •• 1 0 0 0 
0 -1 0 0 ·O 
-1 +l +1 0 +l 
+l 0 0 0 0 
+1 +l 0 0 0 
0 .• 1 0 0 0 
-1 0 0 0 0 
0 .• 1 0 0 0 
-1 --1 0 0 0 
+1 --1 0 0 0 
0 -1 0 0 0 
0 ·H +1 0 0 
o.oo 
Ses!'.ion XVlll .. 1963 
(1) (2) (l) (4) (5) 
+l .1 -1 0 .1 
0 -1 0 0 -1 
0 +l 0 0 -1 
+l 0 0 0 0 
+l +1 0 0 -1 
0 -1 -1 0 -1 
0 0 0 0 -1 
+l -1 -1 0 -1 
0 -1 -1 0 -1 
+1 -1 0 0 -1 
0 -1 -1 0 .1 
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Figure 4. The Voting Behavior of the Arab Caucusing 
Group. 





membership bas growx:i. · This has been due·to the fact that its·new·mem-
bers have been mostly newly independent states who foster policies of 
neutralism .and ncm-involvement in the East.:.West. conflict. 
The European Community. Caucusing·Group 
The· European 'Community group consists of .Belgium,· France,· Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 'This. group came into being.as a conse-
· quence of the Treaty of Rome which· established the Europ.ean Common Market 
in 1957. This·group has only five members because the sixth member, 
West Germany, is not a member of the United Nations. 
The European ·Community group has very strong voting cohesion. 
'This group which, at its inception, voted 100% with the United States, 
has been grad\lally.moving.away from,supporting the u.-s.·posit:Lon-on 
· certain issues.(lO) 
The Latin American·.Caucusing Group 
The twenty Latin Ameri.can members of the United Nations have had 
·a great deal of experience in-diplomatic cooperation·with each other. 
This experience in joint cooperation ·can be·traced ba.ck:aS far .. as the 
League of Nations and the various Pan .. American·organiz~:tions. As a 
caucusing group, the Latin .Americ.an states initiated their joint .consul-
·tations-about the United Nations.at the Chapultepec Conference early 
in 1945. ( ll) 
(10) The causes of this shift are discussed in the final chapter~ 
(11) Hovet, Blac Politics in the United Nations, pp. 64~69. -.--· 
l 
TABLE V 
THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH CAUCUSING GROUP 
Session XI - 1956 Session XII - 19.57 Session nII - 1958 Session XIV - -1959 Session XV - 1960 Session XVI ... 1961 
(1) {2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Australia +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Canada +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l 
-Ceylon 0 -1 +l +l +l al 0 0 +l +l -1 0 0 0 0 -l 0 +l 0 +l -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -l 0 0 +l 
Cyprus 0 0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 
Ghana +l 0 0 0 0 -l 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -l -1 0 0 0 0 
India 0 -1 +l 0 +l -1 0 0 +l +1 -l 0 0 0 0 -1 0 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 0 al -1 0 0 0 +l 
Jamaica 
Malaya +1 +1 +1 0 0 +l +l +1 +1 +1 +l +1 +1 +1 +1 0 +1 -+1 +1 0 +1 +l +1 +1 +1 
New Zealand +l +l +l +l +1 +l +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +l +1 +1 +l +l +1 +1 +l +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +l +1 +1 +1 +1 
N_igeria -1 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 0 0 +1 
Pakistan +l +1 +1 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1. +1 +l +1 +1 +1 +1 0 0 +1 +1 0 +1 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 +1 +1 
Tanganyika 0 0 0 0 0 
Trinidad-Tobago 
Uganda 
Uni ced Kingdom +l +l +l +l +1 +l +l +l +l +1 +1 +l +1 +1 +1 +l 0 +l +1 +1 +1 +l +1 +l +1 +1 +1 +l +1 +1 
YEARLY GROUP SCORES +o.72 +o.60 +o.59 .f0:£,6 +o.43 +o.52 
\ 
Session XVII ... 1962 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
+l +l +l +l +l 
+l +l +l +l +l 
+l -1 0 0 0 
+l 0 +l +l 0 
+l -1 0 0 0 
+l -l +1 +l +l 
+l +1 0 +1 +l 
+1 0 +1 +1 +1 
+1 +1 +l +l +1 
+1 0 0 0 0 
+1 -1 +1 +1 +l 
+1 -1 0 0 0 
+l -l 0 0 0 
+l 0 +1 +l +l 
0 -1 0 0 0 
+1 -l +1 +l +1 
+o.48 
Session XVIII ... 1963 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
+l +l +l +l +l 
+l +l +l +l +l 
+l -1 -l 0 -1 
+l +l +l +l -l 
+l -l -l 0 -l 
+l -1 0 +l -1 
+1 +l +1 +l 0 
+1 +1 +1 +1 0 
+1 +1 +1 +l 0 
+1 0 0 0 -1 
+1 -1 0 +1 -l 
+1 0 0 +1 -l 
+1- -1 0 0 -1 
+l 0 +1 +1 0 
+l -1 0 0 Q 



















Figure 5. The Voting Behavior of the Commonwealth 
Caucusing Group. 






THE VOTING .. BEHAVIOR OF .THE EUROPEAN= COMMUNITY CAUCUSING GROUP 
Session XII - 195 7 Session XIII - 1958 Session XIV - 1959 Session XV - 1960 Sessio11 XVI - 1961 Session XVII - 1962 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Belgium +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +l ·+1 +l +l 1-1 +l 0 +l +l +l +l 
France +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 0 -1 +l +l +l 0 
Italy +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Luxembourg +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Nether lands +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l 
YEARLY GROUP SCORES +1.00 +o.96 +o.92 +o.84 +o.92 +o.80 
Session XVIII. - 1963 
<P (2) (3) (4) (5) 
+l +l +l ·H +l 
0 +l +l ·H +l 
+l . +l +l +l +l 
+l +l +l +l +l 








Figure 6. The Voting Behavior of the Europe~n Community 
Caucµs ing ··Group • 





The v.oting record of the Latin .American group indicates .. a strongly 
uniform-pattern.of votingamong:the members. The caµse.f0r its not 
having.a perfectly identical voting record is due to, a number of absten-
tion votes,.and, more recently, the shifting of .Cuba away from the 
Western camp. In. spite of the decisions of the·Punta del Este meeting 
·of the foreign ministers of the Organization of,Ameri~an·States in 
January, 1962, Cuba has remained.a member·of the Latin.American,caucus-
ing ... gl'.oup. Rather t;han. face ·the .question of the continued membership 
· of ,Cuba, ·. the group. resorted to the· technique of holding .. ad boc.,meetings 
ith .. "f . Cb <12> .w ouLnoti yin,g. u a. 
The voting rec~rd of .the Latin .American group can be interpreted 
as a relatively steady support of t:he u. s.- position,on·political issues 
· of Cold War •significance. 
The. S.candinavian Caucusing Group 
The origin,of·a unified approach by the Scandi~avian states :to 
international organization lies in their.cooperation with·ea~h other 
·in t;he League ·of Nations. The Scandinavian caucusing-group in its pre-
·sent form did not come into being until 1946, .when Sweden, and Iceland 
were.admitted to the United Nations. At that time the group.consisted 
of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland. Finland, which joined the 
United Nations in 1955, w:as under great pressure by the Soviet Union 
to avoid too much association with Wes.tern oriented countries. Never-
theless, Finland joined the Nordic Council in October, 195.6. (lJ) 
(12) Hovet, Afz:ic;:a in t:he United ~ations, p. 17. 
(13) Hovet, Bloc Politics in the_United Nations, pp. 73.;.7p. 
Session Xl - 1956 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
11'.rgentina +l +l +l +l 
Bolivia +f' +l -.. i··--+l 
Brazil +l +l +l +l 
Chile +l +l +l +l 
Colombia +l +l +l +l 
Costa Rica +l +l . 0 +l 
Cuba +l +l 0 +l 
Dominacan Rep. +l +l +l +l 
Ecuador +l +l 0 +l 
El Salvador +l +l 0 +l 
Guatemala +l +l 0 +l 
Haiti +l +l +l +l 
Honduras +l +l 0 +l 
Mexico +l +l 0 +l 
Nicaragua +l +l 0 +l 
Panama +l +l +I +l 
Paraguay +l +l 0 +I 
Peru +l +l +l +l 
Uruguay +l +l +l +l 
Venezuela +l +I +l +l 
YEARLY GROUP SCORES +o.86 
) 
TABLE VII 
THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF: THE LATIN AMERICAN -CAUCUSIN(r ~GROUP -~ 
I i \ ' I Session XII - 1957 Session XIII - 1958 Session XIV - 1959 f Session XV - 1960 Session XVl .. 1961 I Session XVll ... 19b2 \ Session XVlll .. 1963 (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) l (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) r (5) '(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) i (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
l 
I ' +l __ +1J__g +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l . • j +l +l : +l +l f·H- ··-+1- - +I. __ +l .. +l t +l __ +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l - +l +l 0 "+1 +l ~ +i +l ·+1+1 1+1-... .:i:r_,,__..o· ··+1 0 +1 +1 o +1 ·-n· u-· o +l +l +l +l ·+1·· +l "+1 :: r ---+r-· +l +l +1 ,1 0 """+1 +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +11 0 0 +l +l -1 0 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +1 0 +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l :~ :~ i+~ +l +l il 0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 
0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l -l. 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 ~-1 -1 0 -1 -1 
0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l l}t-1 +l +l +l 0 
+l +l 0 +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l tl +l 0 O +l +l 0 H +l tl +l +l +l 0 
+l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l. +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l ' l +l +l +l +l 
+l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l '+l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l i~·l +l +l +l +l 
+l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l 0 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l t,i O +l +l +l -1 
+l 1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +I +I 0 +l +l +l +I +I 
+l ti +l +l +l 0 
+l I +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 0 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l 4+1 +l +l +l -I 
+1 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l 0 +l +I +l +l +l +I +I +l +I +I +l +l +l +l +l +I 
+~ i ~ +! +I +l -1 
0 ! +I +l +l +I 0 +l +l +l +l +l \ +l +l 0 +l +l . +l +l +I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I 0  l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l . 0 +l +l +I 0 
+l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l 0 
+l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +I +l +l +l +l +l r +! +I +l +l +l +I +l +l -I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l D +l +l D +l +l +I +I +l +l +! +l +l +l +l +I +l +l 0 ' 
+o.89 +D.96 +0.87 \ +o.86 I +o.89 l -+-0,89 +o.58 
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Figure 7. The Voting Behavior of the Latin .American 
Caucusing Group. 





The voting record of Finland indicates that even though· it has;not 
voted in·uniform.ity with the other members of the Scandinavian group, 
its record has not been contradictory to the-voting behavior. ot the 
othermenibers ei~her. On the average, Finland voted 40% o.f the time 
with .the Scan~inavtan group, and abstained on-the remainder. This 
type of voting:is-characteristic of the Scandinavians. Asa general 
practice. they do not vote against each othe:i;. .If they do. not vote 
identi~ally, they· tend to, abs~ain rather .than express, opposition to 
each other. 
The Western European Cauousing:Group 
The Western Europ.ean group is a loose ge~gr.aphfc· group. that meets 
with less regularity than any.· other group in ·:the United Naticms, and 
· b h" · h . (l4 ) its mem ers · ip may vary wit meetings. 
Its major function,-aside from·that of consultation on·issues 
affecting the European·continent, appears to be .that of serving as a 
meeting ground for the two European-groups, the Scandinavians. and the 
European· Econ()Illic Comm.unity, with the o·ther c_ountries of Wes tern Europe. 
The. voting record of the W.es tern- European group indicates. -.that. the 
,group.as.a whole has had less·support for·the u. s. position,on-issues 
than one of its major factions, the European·Economic Comm.unity group, 
but:more _than the other faction, the S~andinavians. 'Its support for 
the u. s. position,has been declining slightly fasterthan·that:of the 
European Economic Community. · In 1962 its U. · S. -support score fell 
s 1 ight ly be low that of the Scandinavian gr.oup. 
(14) Hovet, Africa in· the United Nations, P• 13. ---- - ___... . -
",-
TABLE VIII 
THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SCANDINAVIAN CAUCUSING GROUP 
Session XI - 1956 Session XII . 1957 Session XIII - 1958 Session XIV - 1959 Session XV ... 1960 Session XVI - 1961 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) ('<) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Denmark +l -1 +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 0 +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l 
Finland 0 -1 +l 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 +l 0 0 -1 +l 0 +l 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
Iceland +l +i +l +l -ri +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Norway +l -1 · +l +l +l -1 +l +l -+1 +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l 
Sweden +l -1 +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l 0 +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l 0 +l 0 -1 +l +l +l +l 
YEARLY GROUP SCORES +o.60 +o.56 +o.44 + 0.52 +o,48 +o.52 
Session XVII .. 1962 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
+l -1 +l +l +l 
+l -1 0 0 0 
+l 0 +l +l +l 
+l -1 +l +l +l 
+l -1 +l +l +l 
+o,52 
Session XVIII ... 1963 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
+l -1 +l +l 0 
+l -1 0 0 0 
+l 0 +l 0 0 
+l -1 +l <I 0 









. Figure 8. The· Voting· Behavior of the Scandina'U'ian~ .. : 
qaucusing Group • 






THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE WESTERN.EUROPEAN CAUCUSING GROUP 
Session XI - 1956 Session XII - 1957 Session XIII - 1958 Session XIV - 1959 Session XV - 1960 Session A'VI - 1961 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Austria +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l H +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 
Belgi.um +l +I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l 0 +l +I +l +l +l +l 
Cyprus 0 0 +l +I +l 0 +I +l +l +I 
Denmark +l -1 +l +l +l -1 +l +l +I +l -1 0 +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +I -1 +l +l +l +l 
Finland 0 -1 +l 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 +l 0 0 -1 +l 0 +l 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
France +I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l c +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 0 
Greece +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l 0 +l +l +l +1· +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Ice:and +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l +I 
Ireland +l +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l 0 +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l 
Italy +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l +I +l 
Luxembourg +l +l 0 +I +l +l +l +l +l +I +I +l +I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Netherlands +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I l;l +l +I +l +l +l +l 
Norway +I -1 +l +I +l -1 +l +l +l +I -1 +l +l +l +l -1 +l +I +l +l -1 +l +I +l +l -1 +I +I +l +l 
Portugal +I 0 0 +l +I 0 +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +I +l 0 0 *.l +l +l 0 +l +l 0 +l +l 0 0 0 +I 
Spain +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +I +l +l +l +l +l ,+I +l +l 0 +'J. +l +l +l 0 · +l 0 +l +l +I +l. 0 +l 
Sweden +l -1 +l +l +I -1 +I +l +l +l -1 +l 0 +I +l -1 +l +l +l +I -1 +l 0 +I 0 -1 +l +l +l +l 
Turkey +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
United Kingdom +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 0 +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l +l 
Yugoslavia -1 -1 +l -1 0 -1 0 0 0 +l -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 +l 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 
YEARLY GROUP SCORES +o. 76 +o.77 +o.67 +0.71 +o.63 +o. 71 
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Figure 9. The Voting Behavior of the Western European 
Caucusing Group. 







.The Soviet Bloc 
The Soviet-Bloc is the most.tightly organized and cohesive interest 
group in the'Gene:r.al Assembly. The nucleus of the Soviet Bloc was 
created when· the San Francis.co :Conferep.ce admitted Byelorussia and the 
· Ukraine as charter members :of the United Nations. · Byelo-rµssia, .the 
'l!kr.aine, and the Soviet Union,cambined.\olith Yugoslavia and Poland ini.,. 
-tially .as acaucusing·gro1;1p. 'The caucusing.group became a bloc when 
the.Soviet Union extended its cemplete·influence over Poland and the 
Cominform·. was cons-tituted in: 1947 to coordinate. and centralize, the 
political role of the satellites. The bloc was enlar,gedfollowing the 
coup in· Ozechoslayakia in FebrtJary, 1948. The' Molotov Plan in:~anuary_ 
- of· 1949, which completed the economic integration of the satellites, 
further solidified the Soviet :Bloc. · Yugoslavia br-oke with·-the · Com.in"' 
form, .and consequently with the Bloc, in 1948. The ·r-emaining five 
members were joined .by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumanh in. 195,5. 
·The. admis-sion of Mongolia in 1961 raised the· number of members in, the 
Soviet Bloc to.the present.ten.(l5) 
_A very strong degree of cohesion-is evident in the Soviet Bloc. 
·.rn this stud~. there· is only one ·.case of diver.gence from strict. bloc 
voting in the Soviet Bloc, a vote of abstention cast by- Poland in_·the 
Xlth Session of· the Assembly. 
Summary 
The~ Ye.arlyScoresof the Geaeral. Assembly indicate that the 
overall support: for the .American position ,on· political. issues --:of .. Cold 
(15) Hovet, Bloc Politic.s _ in· the United_ Nations, pp. 47-48. -·-
TABLE X 
THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIET BLOC 
':;.c.ss i 01~ ~ie,;si.on Xll - 1957 Session XIII - 1958 Sessioi,.XIV - 1959 Session XV - 1960 Sei::sicn :{\r-f • 1961 
.3) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) {l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (l) (2) (3'; <.'•) (5) (Ii (_ l ) ( :2 ) ~ ·1 
.-'dDani.:. -1 -1 -1 -1 .• 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .. 1 .) -1 -1 -1 
Byeloru~;;,j_,-, --1 -1 .1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -I -1 -1 .[ -1 -1 -1 
Bulgaria -1 -1 .1 .l -1 -1 -1 -1 -l -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -l .. 1 
Czech0s ! av./< i ,::. -1 -I - 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .1 -1 _)_ -1 -1 -1 -1 
Hungary -1 -1 - l -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -l -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Mongol.il.l -1 -l -1 -1 -1 .. 1 
rulo1:1l: -1 -1 - l 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .1 -1 -1 .1 
P.o~ni.e ~l -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .. -1 -1 -1 -1 -I .l -1 -I -1 
Soviet Ur,i Jn -1 - l -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -l -1 -1 -I -1 -~l -1 -I -1 -1 -1 -I -1 -1 .. [ -1 -1 -1 -1 
Ukraine -1 -1 .1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -I -1 -I -1 -I -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
----·--·--··- ··-·-·-----. ···--·---·-------- .. 
YE-1>..RLY c:s.o .'? : (~ORf.S - o. .1.00 .1.00 .1.00 -LOO -1.00 
------··- ·-· --------·- . -----------· 
Se-i, -, 
( ') (l) 
-·--·--
.[ .[ -1 
-1 -1 -1 
-1 -l 
-1 -1 .. 1 
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Figure 10. The Voting Behavior·of the Soviet Bloco 
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War significance decline steadily between the years 1956and 1963. In 
1956 the Net Yearly Score of the General Assembly was+0.52. In 1963 
that score stood at +o.22, anall.:.time·low. 
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The voting records also indicate that the decline in·the support 
for· the American· position did not bring .. about .a corresponding· increase 
in the support for the position of the Soviet Union. In·most cases the 
shift in the voting behavior of caucusing groups was away from support 
of the•United States toward an attitude of non~participation in the 
Cold War conflict. The African Group is an exception to this generali-
zation. In 1961 the African Group shifted from.its neutral attitude 
and to some degree supported the American position on issues of Cold 
War significance. · One possible explanation for the Africanvotin~ shift 
is that the African countries were forced to, abandon, their.attitude of 
abstaining on issues .of Cold War significance because of the African 
,continent itself having become .a major battleground in the Cold War 
conflict. ·Yet· their support for the American position was so relatively 
· low that one· cannot call their shift. a vic.tory for United States foreign 
·policy. 
The ArabGroup exhibited the greatest shiftaway from support of 
the United States. This group had a Yearly.Group Score of +0.43 in 1956, 
and a Yearly Group Score of +0.36 in 1957, but from. 1958 to 1962 it 
dropped toa steady score of zero--~ supporting neither the United States 
·nor the Seviet Union. In 1963 the Yearly Group Score of the Arab Group 
dropped to ;.Q.28, making that group the first, outside the Soviet Bloc, 
to. sµpportthe Soviet Union more than·the United States. 
The voting record of the Afro~Asian Group shews that it supported 
the United States more than the Arab Group and the African Group, but 
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less than·. the whole General Assembly. Since the Arabs. and the Africans 
,are. also members of .the Afro-Asian ,Group, it is' obvious t;hat the non-
Arab As.ians supported the United States more than the rest of the Afr.o-. 
Asian Group. 
'The Soviet Bloc solidly supported the .Soviet Union,with- almost one-
hundred per cent solidarity. In· th.is study there is only one ~ase of 
: divergence from· strict bloc voting in· .the Soviet Bl9c,. a vote o.f absten-
tion cast. by Poland in·theXIth-Session,of the General Assembly. 
All the other groups, while reducing their support of the Un~ted 
States, voted with the United States on political issues of Cold War 
significance more· than the whole General Assembly. The European· G9m-. 
munity Group had .the· highest score in support of the United States, 
followed by- the ~a tin .American Group, the Western European· Gr9up, -the 
Scandi11avian° Group,·. and the Commonwealth Group. 
CHA.PTE~· I II 
CONCLUSION 
In 1955,an·official publication of the United.States. stated that 
11The J.Jnited States has never been defeated on. any. important political 
question·in,the United ~ations. On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
can usually count:on·only 5 out of 60.votes in the General Assembly.n(l) 
The 1955 session· of the· General Assembly was the last year when 
·the United States could count on such overwhelming support for its posi-
· tion on ·major issues. In that sess.ion · the United Nations admitted 16 
new members, which opened the:wayfor·the lllassive expag.sion,of its mem-
bership fr.om the original 51 to the present 114. Some observers link 
the steady decline·of United States. influence in·theUnited Nations 
with the expansion of membership in tJ:i,at. organization .. and the "politi-
cal weakness and dis.orien~ation of lllany of the new members. 11( 2) 
Had this statistical study of the voting b.ehavior of caucusing 
groups in the United Nations General Assembly shown.a decline in the 
support of the·U. S. position ·on important political issues only by 
the.African Group and the Afro-Asian·Group, to which most of the new 
members belong·, such contentions woti1d have been borne out .• · On the 
. (1) Department of State, 11You a,nd the United Nations", Publication 
· No. 5887, International Organi~ation, and Conference Series III. 
105, Washington, 1955. · -.-· 
(2) ·Hans, J.'Morgenthau, 11 The U.N. of Dag Hammarskjold is Dead", The 
·~ Yo~k Times Magazine, Ma,rch 14,' 1965, P• 37. 
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,cont~ary, this study shows a decline in U. S. support on important poli-
tical issues by_ every group •. Table I and Figure 1 reflect this decline. in 
. support of the u. s.· position by the whole General Assembly. 
The voting-behavior of -p.ations in. the General Assembly of the 
· United Nations is a reflection of international politics on. a world 
scale. The clear division·of nations into two distinct groups, one 
supporting.the Soviet Unionand the other supporting the United States, 
in the first ten years of the operation of the United Nations reflected 
the bipolar·nature of world politics. In that era the basic policy 
of the U. ~. was the s.tabilization, through a combination of the two 
tactical weapons of containrilent :and deterrence,. of. the division· of .the 
world between the two,super~powers.< 3 ) 
In regard .to the future of the bipolar system, Hans J. Morgenthau 
wrote: 
The bipolar system contains within.itself two contradictory 
·potentialities: the tendency to expand into. a two-bloc sys-
tem by· absorbing the uncommited nation.s of the world, and 
the tendency to disintegrate under the pull of centrifugal 
forces from within.and the attraction of new power centers 
fr-om within or without.(4) 
This study shows that. at least in the case of one pole, the West, 
the latter possibility· is becoming ·:an, actuality. It could not indicate 
the same process in the Sovi.et pole because one of the centrifugal 
forces within that bloc, Communist China, is not a member of the United 
Nations, but many observers believe that"•••• a gradual process of 
erosion is at work in each of the·two opposing blocs. 11 (5) 
(3) Amitai Etzioni, Winning Without War (Garden City, New York,· 1964), p. 2. 
(4) Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York, 1961), p; 361. 
(5) Roberto Ducci, "The World Order in. the Sixties", .Foreisn .Affair.s, Vol. 
42, No. 3, April, 1964, P• 384. 
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Roberto Ducci has described this p;rocess allegorically as foll.ows: 
11 The two apparently monolithic constructions of the fifties now have 
more resemblance to boiling underground magmas, from which come·rumbles 
indicating the formation of deep and wide crevices. 11 <6) 
The decreasing difference in economic and technical capacity bet-
ween the leading qation,and the. other nations of a bloc is cited as 
one cause of the crumbling of duopoly. (7) This factor, in combination 
with the recurring economic crises.in.the leading nations, can be 
regarded as.a cause only in the specific cases of United States-Western 
European and Soviet Uniort-Eastern European relations. 
World War II left Western Europe economically devastated and mili-
tarily weak. It was in the American interest that a balance of power 
be established in the interior of Europe. Strategically, Western 
·Europe was in control of the sea gateways vital to American security 
the Skagerrak, the English Channel, and the Straits of Gibralter. 
Economically, it.possessed not only the greatest aggregation of skilled 
workers, technicians, and managers outside the United States, but also 
the second greatest concentration of industrial power in the world. 
It was in the interest of American security that Europe be revived.(8) 
The revivification and protection of Europe necessitated massive 
amounts of money and military forces. The United States provided recon-
struction funds through the Marshal Plan, the dollars that Europe's 
trade needed, and most of the forces and finances of NATO. Under these 
. (6) Ibid. 
( 7) Ibid. 
(8) John Spanier, American Foreign PoHcy Since World ~II, (New 
York, 1963), PP• 34-40. 
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circumstances it was only natural that the foreign policy o.f Europe 
follow the dictates of American foreign policy, particularly in dealings 
with the Soviet Union. (9) 
On one issue after .another the Europeans, no matter how they per~ 
sonally felt about it, had to follow the American lead. Economically, 
the Europeans were required by the United States to cooperate with ea~h 
other as a prerequisite for receiving Marshall Plan funds. Politically, 
the United States 11 encouraged 11 Britain's withdrawal from Palestine, 
France's withdrawal from Indochina, Belgium's withdrawal from the Congo, 
. and the Netherlands withdrawal from Indonesia. Militarily, the com-
mander of the NATO forces was always American; Norway and Denmark did 
not form a Nordic defense union with Sweden, in part, because the United 
States objected; West Germany was re-armed and accepted as a member of 
NATO. in 1955 under considerable American pressure. In the process, this 
heavy-handed leadership made the United States quite unpopular in 
Europe. A French senator, expressing a widely held opinion, said in 
·1958: 11 At bottomthe conflict is that America and France have neither 
the same world interests nor policy goals. America looks after her 
own self-interest, which is entirely different from ours.11(10) 
By 1961 European economic.reconstructionhad longbeen.completed 
and its need for dollars satisfied while, at the same time, the United 
States had come upon a balance of payments difficulty. At a time when 
the United States needed the help of Europe to halt its increasing 
gold outflow, Europe, under French leadership, not only refused to 
(9) Etzioni, p. 38. 
(10) As cited in Etzioni, P• 39. 
help, but took steps to aggravate the American f i~ancial situatio.n. 
Only recently France has begun converting its large dollar holdings 
into gold. As the European Common·Marketscheme succeeded in turning 
·Europe into a major industrial and commercial power competing with 
American industry, Europe became less and less willing to. follow the 
American foreign .policy line. ( ll) 
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This situation.also holds true for the Communist Bloc. The Soviet 
Union has been in the grip of a severe agricultural crisis while the 
Comecon,countries have lacked to it for the capital necessary for 
their further development. This, in combination with o.ther factors, 
is the probable cause of· -the Rumanian drift away from the Soviet orbit 
and toward the European Community. 
The decreasing difference in economic and techr:i.ical capacity bet-
ween the leading nation, and the other .nations of a bloc has made it 
possible for some countries to break:away in order to form new poles, 
but this economic .and technical difference is still very real in the 
case of many other countries. In the case of the underdeveloped coun-
·tries the sit\lation· is reversed; it is the·desire of the poor countries 
to reach the level of economic development achieved' by the bloc. leader 
·that has placed .them.out:;side the bipolar system. By remaining uncom-
mitted,.an.underdeveloped country can.accept, indeed, bid for ec9nomic 
aid from all. sides. Aside fr.om the.real financial value of such.a 
stand, by diversifying its reliance on- external assistance the uncom-
mitted nation· minimizes the potency of foreign influence in its dome.s-
·tic life. 
(11). Etzioni, p. 41. 
.A case in,pG>int is Ghana. Even.though Ghana has been, a British 
responsibility and, therefore, has received most of i_ts development 
aid from Britain, the United States has. also been a great source of 
funds for that country. For example, Ghana received $26,400,000 in 
grants and loa.ns fr.om the. United S_tates in the period 1953~1961 and, 
. at the present, the United States is strongly committed to. the finan'~ 
cing of the Volta River Project.02) At the same time Ghana bas been 
, able. to attract capital from the· Soviet. Uniqn. F.or example,. Ghana 
received $40,000,000 in loans _and credit.from the Soviet Union in.19.60 
. alone~U)With the entry of .Peking in the interl).ational political arena, 
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Ghana has discovered another source of capital. An. agreement was signed 
.between Ghana and China in July, 1964 to enable Ghana to receive a 
$22,400,000 loan fpr economic.and technical purposes. The loan, which 
is interest-free, must be repaid in. ten years star.ting in -1974. In 
· 1961, China loaned Ghana $19,6QO,OOO.(l4) 
Economic development. is not the greatest problem-with which the 
newly-independent countries.are faced. The problem of "state-building" 
is of primary impor;ance.and has the -greatest influence on matters of 
fore.i,.gn· policy. 
11State~building" is the problem of building.an-entity within arbi-
trarily drawn boundaries that can justly qualify to be.a nation; where 
the people are united by common beliefs, common ideals, common.aims --
(12) Vernon·McKay, Africa in.World Politics (New Yark, 19-63), p.36~. 
(13) Ibid., P• 232. · 
(14) 11 China Lends Another LSm, 11 
zine, July 23, 1964, p. 13. 
Times & .Tide, The. British News Maga-----· ~------
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in short, by common bonds. This is a difficult task for many of the newly-
independent. countries because the populace living· within their ar.tif icially 
drawn boundaries co.nsists of many radically· diverse peoples, professing 
different.religions, speaking different lang1.1ages, and having different 
backgrounds.(l5) 
These differences were somewhat overlooked during the struggle for 
independence from the colonial masters. They were overlooked because, 
at the time, there existed a c0$non unifying bond, the struggle for 
political independence. After the colonial master had been physically 
eliminated from the scene there remained no visible unifying bond and, 
therefore, the old: internal antagonisms returned to. the fore. 
There is a unifying role w~ich economic gro~th could play in break-
ing down separatist. tendencies. The key factor in this role of econo-
mic growth is the market economy. One characteristic of the market eco-
nomy is that it places primary recognition on individual performance 
rather than. on tribal affiliation or clan status; and in this way, as 
· more and more people. are drawn into it,· it can progressively minimize 
~the tribal differences.(16) 
(15) For example, accord.ing to. the Encyclopaedia BTitannica, the popu-
lation of India consists of seven-racial types, speaking thirteen 
main languages (782 languages in.all), and a«iihering to eight main 
. religions. 
According to Freda Wolfson (Pageant.of Ghana, London, Oxford 
University Pres.s, 1958), the seven ·.million inhabitants of Gh•na 
belong to thirty .. six principal tribes and many more minor tribes. 
Accordi~gto P.A.Owideru ("Proposals for a National Language for 
Ghana", ·African Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 251, April, 1964), there are 
five principal languages having some literatureused by the inhabi-
tants of Ghana, and many,more dialects and languages without any 
literature. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the majority 
of the people of Ghana ar~.animists, though there ha general belief 
in a supreme diety. The 1eading Christian communities .are Methodist, 
Presbyterian,. and Roman Catholic. · There is also a substantial 
Moslem element. · 
(16) Arnold Rivkin; .The African Presence in World Affairs (New-York, 1963), 
P• 22. 
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But economic growth is a long range propositionand, therefore, 
of little use in preventing.the impending chaos and dismemberment of the 
ne~ly-formed country. 'I'he logical answer is to continue the revolution 
.against the colonial master·in spite of the fact that the colonial mas-
ter is no longer physically present. 
Anti-colonialism was the common unifying·bond that in the pre-
inde.pendenc:e days held together .otherwise incompatible groups. Now, 
translated into neutralism.and non-alignment, it perpetuates the cohe-
sive.role of the revolution.against colonialism. It also underscores 
the existence and integrity of the newly-independent coun.~ry which has 
been detached from the identity of its former colonial master. 
The voting record of the newly;..independent countries of Africa 
and Asia in the United Nations General Assembly indicates that the 
majority chose not to take sides on issues of East~West conflict. One 
cannot accuse them of acting irresponsibly by casting votes of absten-
tion, nor can they be accused of being blind to the realities of the 
Cold War. It must be understood that the anti-colonialist attitude, 
so vital to the.survival and unification of the newly-independent coun-
try, does not permit taking the same stand on a majoX' politi.cal issue 
.as the countX'ies which are identified as colonialists or supporters of 
colonialists. 
In·recent years the attitude of refraining from taking a stand on 
Cold War issues~- the attitude of neutralism -- has had more influence 
on voting behavior in the United Nations than the tactics of the Commun-
. ists·since the inception of that organization. Arthur·P. WhitakeJ;" 
explains the rising disaffection of the Latin.American bloc toward the 
West in general, and the United States in particular, through the spread 
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,of.the idea of neutralism: 11 The explanation seems to lie in the.spread 
not so much of pro-Communism ,as of neutralisni. 11 (17) 
_Whatever -the causes may -be, the process of the disintegration of 
the rigid bipolar -system is verr real. This disintegration· has become 
possible because the effectiveness of the nuclear protection afforded 
by each of the two bloc leaders is diminishing .and the fear of nuclear 
reprisal against political misbehavior is vanishing.. The risk. of total 
annihilation is so-~reat that it isinconceivablethat nuclear·,-,eapons 
would-be used to protect or harm bloc members. 
Furthermore, the .two bloc leaders no longer hold a mon.opoly·over 
nuclear weaponry. France and Communist China, despite the relative 
smallness of their nuclear. arsenals a·nd the· low potential of their 
delivery systems, have become new choices as group leaders. 
Also the psychological effect of drawing the line between capita-
·Hsm -and communism, as between good and evil, has worn out-after fifteen 
:years of Cold War tension. "Imperialist encirclement" and the 11 Con-
spiracy of International C.ommunism11 have ceased to serve effectively 
.. as all .. purpose explanations and causes. 
Finally, the rise of neo;..nationalism.and neo;..neutra1ism --perhaps 
.as an indirect result of one decade of bipolarity -- has closed any 
possibilities af returning .to the bipolar system. · Now· there .are any 
-number of forms that the-world order could take, but the termination 
af duopoly renders the methodology utilized in this .thesis useless for 
the studyaf.those forms. 
(17) Arthur.-P. Whitaker, "The Latin-American Bloc", in Franz B. Gross 
. (e.d •. ), The :Uni.ted States .and the Uni_ted Nations· (Norman, Oklahoma, 
'1964), ~i88. ..- - . 
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